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It is a great pleasure to visit Vanderbilt Law School and to
dedicate the Alyne Queener Massey Library. The University is for-
tunate to have friends like the Masseys who, by their generous gift,
carry on a proud and honorable tradition. That tradition began in
1873 when Commodore Vanderbilt provided Bishop McTyeire with
the gift that resulted in the establishment of this splendid
university.
Sir Walter Scott once said that "a lawyer without history or
literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses
some knowledge of these, he may venture to call himself an archi-
tect."1 If I may "build" on Sir Walter's concept, I would add that
before a lawyer is entitled to think of himself or herself as an "ar-
chitect," two additional attributes-professional competence, and
social responsibility are needed. While a background of history and
literature is provided by the liberal education that American law
schools typically encourage prior to the formal study of the law, it
is the law school that bears the heavy responsibility of providing
training to prospective lawyers in the areas of professional compe-
tence and the ethical practice of law.
On this occasion of dedicating the Alyne Massey library, Van-
* Copyright © by Sandra D. O'Connor. This speech was delivered at the dedication of
the Alyne Queener Massey Law Library at Vanderbilt University School of Law on
September 24, 1982.
** Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. W. Scorr, Guy MANNERING 37 (1815).
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derbilt Law School is presented with a unique opportunity to reaf-
firm its dedication to excellence in training lawyers whose profes-
sional competence is matched by their sense of professional
responsibility. When the present Law School was dedicated almost
twenty years ago, then-Dean John Wade proposed that the goal of
the Law School "should be not merely to instruct in the principles
of the law but to prepare the whole lawyer, the complete lawyer,
the great lawyer. . . .. Dean Wade believed that the "great law-
yer" could be produced by training law students to fulfill the five
functions of a lawyer as described by Chief Justice Arthur Vander-
bilt of New Jersey.' These five functions of a lawyer included being
a wise counselor, a skilled advocate, a contributor to the improve-
ment of the legal system, an unselfish and courageous leader of
public opinion, and a professional willing to answer the call for
public service. As Dean Wade correctly observed, these five func-
tions are related both to concern for a lawyer's ability to represent
his clients effectively, and to concerns for the broader responsibili-
ties of the lawyer to society. Dean Wade contended that while the
law was an ordering process that required a-certain degree of sta-
bility, a good lawyer should "seek to improve the law not just in
order to aid his clients but in order to make it a more effective
instrument to meet the general needs of current times."4
That vision of a professionally and ethically complete legal ed-
ucation should no longer be considered a goal to be reached by
America's law schools someday. Rather, if lawyers are to serve
their clients with the professional competence that those clients
expect and deserve, while at the same time serving the needs of an
ever more complex society and world, the Vanderbilt vision es-
poused by John Wade must become a reality for our profession as
a whole, and it must become a reality now. It is in this context that
I wish to make my comments concerning professional competence
and social responsibility.
I. PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
The first responsibility of a law school is obviously to prepare
its students for the practice of law in the sense of training them to
2. Wade, Legal Education and the Demands for Stability and Change Through Law,
17 VAND. L. REv. 155, 161 (1963).
3. See id.; see also Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients
and the Public, 40 A.B.A. J. 31 (1954). Chief Justice Vanderbilt was no relation to Commo-
dore Vanderbilt's family.
4. Wade, supra note 2, at 165.
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be effective and competent advocates. That is certainly not to say
that law schools should emphasize practical concerns at the ex-
pense of legal theory. On the contrary, professional competence be-
gins with proper and complete training in legal method and legal
reasoning. Only when the basic tools have been learned, does it
make sense to focus on practical training. Young lawyers, of course,
will receive much of their practical training after leaving law school
and as they actually engage in the practice of law. However, it is
folly to think that respect for the competent use of the tools of our
profession will be developed "later on" in the "real world" if that
respect is not also nurtured as part of the formal legal training.
A 1978 Law School Admission Council study of 1600 practic-
ing lawyers who graduated from law school in 1955, 1965, and
1975, indicates that law schools played little or no role in develop-
ing many practical skills considered to be essential in practice.5 For
example, 77.3% said that law school provided no training or un-
helpful training in teaching negotiation skills.6 Further, 68.6% said
that their legal education provided no training or unhelpful train-
ing in counseling clients. 7 Forty-four percent said that law school
provided no training or unhelpful training in the ability to draft
legal documents. 8
When lawyers are licensed to practice law, the public has a
right to assume and does assume that the person licensed has re-
ceived training in how to perform the basic functions of a lawyer,
including counseling, negotiating, and the preparing of documents.
Certainly, a large number of the citizens feel, with justification,
that lawyers should "not be let loose on the public" until they have
received instruction in such matters. There are only two ways in
which the public can be provided with this basic protection. One
way is to insist that law schools provide such training. The other
way is to impose a requirement that there be an internship pro-
gram prior to licensing. Few people are supportive of an intern ap-
proach. This means that law schools need to fill the gap in provid-
ing the necessary training.
I encourage this law school and other law schools in our coun-
try to address this problem in more depth than has formerly been
the case. Thousands of lawyers each year commence practice with-
5. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 264 (1978).





out the benefit of the help and training they should have had. Both
they and their clients will benefit by any improvements in the
practical training provided in law school.
II. ETHICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
In placing a very high value on training our young lawyers to
be efficient advocates, we must not see professional competence
alone as the sole aim of legal training. In addition to teaching our
young lawyers to be skilled and responsible in a technical sense,
there is another type of responsibility-moral and social responsi-
bility-that should not be ignored. Even technically competent
lawyers who fail to recognize the fundamentally moral nature of
their tasks and their responsibility to society to serve the abstract
ideal of justice, are, as Jonathan Swift once said, engaged in activ-
ity no loftier than "proving by words multiplied for the purpose
that white is black and black is white, according as they are paid."9
In his dedication address at Vanderbilt Law School twenty
years ago, Dean Wade said that "[lt is... in the area of public
responsibilities that the law schools have been least adequate in
their endeavor to prepare the law student."10 Unfortunately, it
does not appear that in the intervening years legal education has
significantly improved in this regard. There is perhaps more public
skepticism than before about the ability of lawyers to serve as a
constructive force in society as a whole."
The extent to which some members of the bar neglect their
responsibility to society is illustrated by the current controversy
concerning whether bar associations ought to impose a mandatory
pro bono requirement on their members because of the failure of
the private bar to respond voluntarily and adequately to the needs
of the poor and the underprivileged."' The American Bar Associa-
tion has instituted the Pro Bono Activation Project to help state
and local bar associations to establish volunteer pro bono programs
because current pro bono activity is "simply not sufficient to meet
the needs of all those who are unable to afford a lawyer."'" These
activities serve to highlight an unfortunate failure of some lawyers
9. J. Swnr, GuLrnvn's TRAvmLs 152 (1952).
10. Wade, supra note 2, at 162.
11. See, e.g., Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HIpm, Oct. 1976, at 27.
12. See, e.g., Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 A.B.F.
REs. J. 1; Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2
C.swozo L. REv. 255 (1981).
13. Smith, President's Page, 66 A.B.A. J. 1166, 1166 (1980).
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to recognize the social and moral responsibilities of their
profession.
In addition, there are some lawyers who do not meet minimal
ethical standards when it comes to serving their own clients. A re-
cent American Bar Association study of the public discipline of
lawyers by state and federal courts covering 1977-1981 indicates
that there was a 72% increase in the instances of public discipline
of lawyers by state courts and a 66% increase in the instances of
public discipline by federal courts.14 Some of the increase is no
doubt the result of the increased number of lawyers admitted to
practice, and some may be the result of a more effective effort by
the bar and the court to discipline those who transgress. Neverthe-
less, there is no room for complacency.
Although lawyers have historically not been the most popular
group of professionals in society, it can scarcely be doubted that,
for better or for worse, lawyers occupy a special position in the
administration of justice. In a society of laws, lawyers control the
tools that are necessary for orderly social change. In many respects
the public can gain access to our system of justice only through the
services of lawyers. As lawyers, we must recognize fully the heavy
responsibility that comes with the special privilege that we hold as
the primary actors in our legal system.
In my view there is some relationship between any failures
within the legal profession and a failure of the transgressors to see
issues of professional responsibility as involving moral questions
requiring moral solutions. Not all problems faced by lawyers raise
merely legal issues requiring solutions arrived at by applying "legal
method."
In many respects, legal education is preoccupied with "legal-
ism," or the theory that legal reasoning and method is autonomous
and divorced from moral considerations or the institutions of soci-
ety generally. 15 Although training in legal method is crucial to the
development of professional competence, a view that legal method-
ology can resolve all the problems encountered by a lawyer ne-
14. See American Bar Ass'n, National Center for Professional Responsibility, Standing
Comm. on Public Discipline of Lawyers by Disciplinary Agencies, 1977-81 (July 1982). This
study is based on voluntary reports by the appropriate jurisdictions to the National Center.
15. In a recent article Professor James Elkins of the West Virginia University has
made this insightful comment: "Historically, legal education rests on a fundamental belief in
the separation of law and morality. Current pedagogical practices and values implicit in law
teaching push students to replicate this jurisprudential separation of law and morality in
their conceptions of professional responsibility." Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in
Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1982).
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glects other aspects of a socially responsible lawyer's professional
life.
Perhaps it is not surprising that legal education has not gener-
ally prepared lawyers to consider the moral and ethical values as-
sociated with the practice of law. No less distinguished a jurist
than Oliver Wendell Holmes advocated that the study of law
should be entirely separated from considerations of morality. In
The Path of the Law,16 he stated: "For my own part, I often doubt
whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance
could be banished from the law altogether .... ,,17 This strong
language has led legal scholars to fasten onto what they perceive to
be the non-moral theory of law expressed by Justice Holmes in
that essay, at the expense of an important limitation on that the-
ory expressed by Holmes himself in the same essay when he said:
I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have
to say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness and external de-
posit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of
the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good
citizens and good men.1"
Justice Holmes was right to emphasize that for pedagogical
purposes, there is a difference between what law is and what law
ought to be. It would be to encourage confused thinking if validity
and morality were not considered to be two separate virtues of le-
gal rules, at least for the purpose of learning what the law is in the
first instance. Nevertheless, Justice Holmes' position is misunder-
stood and removed from context if construed to go beyond its sta-
tus as simple, practical advice for clear thinking. His advice is
surely consistent with teaching the moral bases of criticism of valid
law.
The difficulties with separating legal education from all moral
discourse are obvious and troubling. The fundamental principles
and institutions of American law did not arise as a legal response
to social problems. Rather, our principles and the institutions
based on them arose as a moral response to the problem of social
injustice, and they continue to evolve as our notions of what con-
stitutes justice become more enlightened.
Moreover, as James Pike observed:
The fact is ... that virtually every lawyer wants to feel that he is not
only a good lawyer (in the sense of technical proficiency) but that he is a
16. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. Rav. 457 (1897).
17. Id. at 464.
18. Id. at 459.
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lawyer of impeccable integrity. He not only wishes this to be his public image;
he wishes to think this of himself. Self-acceptance is a very important ele-
ment-perhaps the most important element-of a wholesome, serviceable
personality.1
In our laudable attempt to train law students to "think like
lawyers" by teaching them legal method, we must not lose sight of
the fact that questions of professional responsibility cannot prop-
erly be resolved with the same legal framework of analysis. Rather,
we must see that as professionals with almost exclusive access to
our system of justice, we have moral responsibilities totally outside
the scope of the legal rules, and not amenable to analysis in terms
of legal method. It is time to return to consideration of the moral
and spiritual foundations of our legal system. It is time to train our
law students to face the hard issues with a conceptual framework
that transcends legal reasoning alone. It is a mistake to think that
moral philosophy and value inquiry have no place in law offices or
law schools. Laws reflect, and sometimes even help to form, the
moral beliefs of society. To neglect the moral basis of law is to
neglect the lifeblood of the norms that establish social order and
preserve liberty. Lawyers who are truly sensitive to their role as
moral agents in society will view their responsibility to the public
as a necessary consequence of being entrusted with exclusive ac-
cess to our cherished system of justice.
III. THE VANDERBILT VISION
Today, I urge this marvelous law school to recommit itself
more strongly than ever before to the ideals that have made it
unique among American law schools. In 1963, Professor Theodore
Smedley presented the "Vanderbilt experiment" to legal educators
in an article in the Journal of Legal Education.20 This "experi-
ment" was a law-school-wide effort to teach the broad issues of a
lawyer's social and moral responsibility in the context of regular
substantive courses so that morality and ethics would be presented
as "integral elements" of a lawyer's professional status. 1 We must
certainly also remember the late Elliot Evans Cheatham, a pioneer
in the field of professional responsibility and long a member of this
faculty, who developed a course on the Profession of Law that was
19. J. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL MEANING OF THE LAWYER'S
VOCATION 91 (1963).
20. Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale-"The Vanderbilt Experi-
ment," 15 J. LEGAL EDUc. 435 (1963).
21. Id. at 437.
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intended to go well beyond the traditional legal ethics course. The
course was supplemented by lectures from leading members of the
bench and bar, and by discussions and debates on issues of law
reform and public interest.22 It is my understanding that Vander-
bilt is now in the process of shifting from the pervasive method to
a more traditional approach involving specific ethics courses. I urge
you to consider carefully the value of the pervasive method, espe-
cially when used in first-year courses. The pervasive approach is a
truly unique way of blending your concerns for professional com-
petence and professional responsibility.
You at Vanderbilt Law School are the successors to a rich her-
itage of legal education founded on the assumption that a great
lawyer is not only a competent technician, but a driving force in
the development of his profession and society. You are justifiedly
proud of the "Vanderbilt vision" of the training of lawyers com-
mitted to professional and moral excellence. The dedication of the
Alyne Queener Massey Library affords the opportunity to preserve
your heritage, and to recommit yourselves to the complete recogni-
tion of the ideals it embodies. By so doing you will continue to
produce the type of lawyers that our nation needs to face the un-
paralleled demands of the next century.
22. Wade, supra note 2, at 162-63.
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